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Terrorist attacks are a terrifying reality for countries all over the world . They can take the lives 
of innocent people, cause millions of dollars in property damage, and put a damper on the 
economy. Fortunately, many countries have developed terrorism insurance programs to cover 
property damage from these attacks and protect the economy from the harmful effects of 
these losses. In the United States, terrorism insurance comes in the form ofthe Terrorism Risk 
Insurance Act of 2002 and its extensions occurring in 2005, 2007, and 2015. In this paper, I give 
an overview of each of these acts, briefly acknowledge the similarities and differences among 
terrorism insurance programs around the world, and then examine the idea that the United 
States will always need the Terrorism Risk Insurance Program to protect the insurance industry 
and the economy. 
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On September 11, 2001, terrorists hijacked commercial airplanes and crashed them into 
the World Trade Center towers in New York City and the Pentagon in Virginia. These attacks 
occurred nearly fourteen years ago and instantly became a landmark event in the history of the 
United States. The events of that day planted fear and uncertainty in the backs of the minds of 
citizens and government officials alike. Nothing on this scale had ever happened to the United 
States before, and since the attack was unprecedented, no one knew how to handle it. 
Everyone was left wondering if this was ushering in a new age for the United States in which 
events like this would become commonplace. In the fourteen years that have since passed, the 
trend has fortunately been that events such as this are not the norm as people once feared 
they would become; however, this does not mean that the threat has not always loomed over 
the country. This threat is precisely why the United States government saw fit to pass 
legislation implementing the Terrorism Risk Insurance Program. 
Prior to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, terrorism was considered an 
insignificant risk to property and casualty insurance companies despite events such as the 
attack on the World Trade Center in 1993 and the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995. Because of 
this, terrorism tended to be covered under general insurance policies and there was no special 
consideration in ratemaking for the risk. It is for this reason that the attacks on the Pentagon 
and the World Trade Center left insurers reeling. They simply were not equipped or prepared 
for losses of this magnitude. In the wake of the attacks, insurance companies began to 
reevaluate terrorism as an insurance risk as the United States suddenly realized that terrorism 
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could happen on its soil. Insurers began doing everything they could to make sure they were 
adequately protected against future events, even if this meant removing terrorism from their 
policies. Similarly, financial institutions also began to reevaluate the risk terrorism posed for 
commercial construction loans and mortgages that were issued. Due to the high degree of 
uncertainty the risk of terrorism posed, financial institutions began making terrorism insurance 
a requirement for issuing such loans. However, this posed a problem for those looking to secure 
these loans. Insurers were worried about their ability to sustain another loss like the September 
2001 attacks. As stated, many insurers felt that they had to remove terrorism from their 
policies because they could not accurately cover it. Those companies that did keep the 
coverage felt that due to the high degree of risk and unpredictability ofterrorism, they could 
only offer the coverage at premiums so high that hardly anyone could afford them. In addition 
to this, limits on this coverage were driven significantly downward to amounts that insurance 
companies felt more comfortable paying out if something were to happen. Therefore, coverage 
was not available in many cases, and when it was, it came in the form of policies that did not 
make sense for most to purchase. In the months following the 2001 attacks, many commercial 
construction projects were halted because ofthis lack ofterrorism insurance accessibility. This 
stunted a reeling U.S. economy as the country struggled to recover from the assaults. 
Fortunately, the government recognized this issue and moved to quickly stabilize the economy 
and help protect it from any further attacks that may come. Thus, in November 2002, the 
Terrorism Risk Insurance Act was signed into law. (Bacchus, Clark, and Rabs) 
This paper will provide an overview of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 as well 
as the highlights ofthe extensions to the Terrorism Risk Insurance Program that took place in 
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2005,2007, and 2015. Terrorism insurance programs in other countries around the world will 
be briefly covered before the argument is made that the United States economy still needs and 
will always need the Terrorism Risk Insurance Program or some program that provides a similar 
protection to the insurance industry and thus the United States economy. 
II. The Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 
As the country was still reeling from the attacks, the government began investigating 
what would be needed in order for insurers to offer terrorism insurance and what the 
consequences would be if terrorism insurance could not be offered at affordable rates for 
everyone. Congress found in these investigations that having terrorism insurance available at 
affordable rates was "critical to economic growth, urban development, and the construction 
and maintenance of public and private housing, as well as to the promotion of United States 
exports and foreign trade" (Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002). It also noted that insurers are 
essential to the stability of the economy and that their ability to cover terrorism risks is vital to 
the recovery of our country following an attack. Congress then went on to recognize the 
inability for insurers to properly assess and price the risk, and therefore it concluded that the 
government "should provide temporary financial compensation to insured parties" so that the 
insurance industry could be protected while being given time to create "systems, mechanisms, 
products, and programs necessary to create a viable financial services market for private 
terrorism risk insurance" (Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002). Based on these findings and 
conclusions, Congress passed the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 to support insurance 
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companies in providing coverage for terrorism while the industry worked toward assessing the 
risk to a point where it could stand alone in providing the coverage. 
The act set up a program that would expire in 2005 unless extended. In order for it to 
work, Congress had to ensure that there would be a high rate of participation. Therefore, 
participation in the program was made mandatory for all property and casualty insurers. The 
act only applies to certain lines of insurance, however. It used the term "property and casualty 
insurance" to mean "commercial lines of property and casualty insurance, including excess 
insurance, workers' compensation insurance, and surety insurance" (Terrorism Risk Insurance 
Act of 2002). Lines of insurance that were listed as excluded in the act include crop insurance, 
private mortgage insurance, title insurance, financial guaranty insurance, medical malpractice 
insurance, life and health insurance, flood insurance, and reinsurance. (Terrorism Risk 
Insurance Act of 2002) 
The act was designed so that if another act ofterrorism occurred, the government 
would share some of the costs of paying policy holders for their damages so that insurance 
companies would not go bankrupt from potentially catastrophic losses. When and if such an act 
occurred, however, there were some conditions that would have to be met before the 
government would become responsible for part of the losses. First, the total amount of the 
losses would have to exceed $5 million; if aggregate losses were less than this amount, they 
would not even be considered for federal assistance. If this condition was met, the next step 
was for the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Attorney general to certify 
the act as an official act of terrorism. If this happened, then the third and perhaps most 
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important criterion would come into play. This condition said that the aggregate industry losses 
for certified terrorism acts would have to exceed $100 million during that year. This was crucial 
because even if there were multiple acts of terrorism in a single year, they would not qualify for 
government assistance if their total amount of losses did not exceed $100 million. (Terrorism 
Risk Insurance Act of 2002) 
Once the three conditions were met, the insurance industry had a deductible that would 
have to be satisfied. This deductible was figured as a percentage of the previous year's direct 
earned premiums for the insurer. It started out as one percent during the transition period and 
then increased to seven percent in year one of the program, ten percent in year two, and 
fifteen percent in year three. All losses above the deductible and below the $100 billion liability 
cap were then shared between the federal government and insurers. The government would 
pay ninety percent of these losses. The insurance industry would be responsible for the 
remaining ten percent up to a limit of $10 billion in the first year of the program, $12.5 billion in 
the second year, and $15 billion in the third year. Any losses above the $100 billion total liability 
cap in a given year were neither the responsibility of the federal government nor the insurance 
industry. It is important to note, however, that the portion of losses paid by the government 
would not simply be gone. The government was given the ability to charge insurance 
companies in the future in order to recoup the money it paid out to help them under this act. 
(Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002) 
With this program in place, the insurance industry as well as the rest of the country felt 
safer about the ability of the United States to financially handle potential future terrorist 
8 
attacks. One important part of the act was its guidelines to be used by the Secretary of State, 
Secretary of the Treasury, and Attorney General for defining an event as an act of terrorism. It 
states that the action had to be a "violent act or an act that is dangerous to human life, 
property, or infrastructure" (Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002). The terrorist event must 
have resulted in damage within the United States or to a United States vessel outside the 
country. Moreover, the person(s) who carried out the event must have been acting on behalf of 
foreign persons or interests with the intent to influence the policies or actions of the United 
States government. It is important to note that the Terrorism Risk Insurance Program does not 
include any actions that occur as part of a war declared by Congress. Finally, the act also states 
that only the Secretary of State, Secretary of the Treasury, and Attorney General have the 
power to declare that an event was an act of terrorism, and that once they have done so, no 
one may challenge their decision. (Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002) 
III. Terrorism Risk Insurance Extension Act of 2005 
With the expiration ofthe Terrorism Risk Insurance Program growing near, Congress 
recognized that despite the fact that it had been several years since the events of September 
11, 2001, the insurance industry still was not equipped to handle the risk of terrorism on its 
own. In 2005 Congress therefore moved to extend the reach of the program for an additional 
two years to 2007. The original act of 2002 was kept mostly the same with a few small changes. 
Commercial automobile insurance, burglary and theft insurance, and surety insurance were 
added as excluded lines of insurance under the act, and directors and officers liability insurance 
was added as in included line. The insurer deductibles in the next two years were set 
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respectively as 17.5 percent and twenty percent of the previous year's direct earned premiums. 
The extension kept the government's share of terrorism losses at ninety percent during the 
fourth year ofthe program, but then decreased it to eighty-five percent in the fifth year. The 
aggregate retention amounts for the insurance industry were set at $25 billion for year four of 
the program and $27.5 billion for year five. (Terrorism Risk Insurance Extension Act of 2005) 
IV. Terrorism Risk Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2007 
The next extension of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Program was signed just days before 
the program's expiration in 2007, and while it maintained essentially the same program 
structure, it made a few important changes as well. First, the act extended the program for 
seven more years rather than two years as the previous acts had done. This was beneficial for 
the United States economy because it "reduced the uncertainty for long-term commercial 
projects that there would be coverage for damage caused by terrorism" ("Terrorism Risk and 
Insurance"). An even more important change, though, was that this extension broadened the 
program's scope of coverage for acts of terrorism. The original Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 
2002 and its extension in 2005 only covered acts of terrorism committed by foreign terrorists. 
In 2007, however, Congress decided to also include domestic acts of terrorism in the program. 
This would become a relevant point in the Boston Marathon bombings of 2013. 
Another important piece of the reauthorization was that it gave a specific process for 
Congress to follow when determining pro rata payments for insurers following a terrorism loss. 
Prior to this act, there had been no real guideline for this process; thankfully, this lack of 
structure had never been an issue. The act also made some adjustments to the methods that 
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would be used for the federal recoupment of losses. Finally, the act ordered that a report be 
done on the "availability and affordability of insurance coverage for losses caused by terrorist 
attacks involving nuclear, biological, chemical, or radiological materials" as well as "the outlook 
for such coverage in the future" and the ability of the insurance industry to manage the risk 
associated with nuclear, biological, chemical, or radiological terrorist attacks (Terrorism Risk 
Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2007). It was also ordered that the reports on 
terrorism insurance as a whole that had begun with the original act in 2002 continue being 
done. 
V. Terrorism Risk Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2015 
As 2014 was drawing to a close, the expiration for the Terrorism Risk Insurance Program 
was growing near and Congress had trouble coming to an agreement in order to pass an 
extension. There was great uncertainty within the insurance industry as time was running out 
for lawmakers to come to an agreement. If the program expired, insurers would no longer be 
required to offer terrorism insurance, and without the program's support, most would also be 
unable to offer it.Despite the fact that the Terrorism Risk Insurance Program had been 
supporting the insurance industry for more than a decade, the industry still did not have 
anywhere near the amount of actuarial data needed to properly project rates for terrorism 
coverage; the United States had not seen any other terrorist events like those of September 11, 
2001 during the time of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Program. There was great worry that 
coverage would rapidly become unaffordable as it had once been and then this would have 
negative impacts on the economy. There was even buzzing about whether major events that 
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would draw large crowds such as the Super Bowl would still be held ifthe Terrorism Risk 
Insurance Program was allowed to expire. With the expiration drawing nearer and nearer, it 
began to become apparent that Congress would not get an extension passed before it 
adjourned for the year. Insurers took note of this and began taking steps to protect themselves 
against tragedies following the program's expiration. Some carriers even began "issuing non­
renewal notices to high profile financial service companies" in order to allow their terrorism 
coverages to expire with the program (Bacchus, Clark, and Rabs). As 2014 ended, Congress 
adjourned and the Terrorism Risk Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2007 expired along 
with a great deal of terrorism coverage all across the country. 
Aware of the impact that the expiration of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Program could 
have, Congress made passing an extension a top priority when it reconvened in 2015. On 
January 12, 2015, the Terrorism Risk Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2015 was signed 
into law. The act extends the Terrorism Risk Insurance Program until the end of the year 2020. 
Several significant changes to the original act were made in this reauthorization. One major 
change in terms ofthe certification of an act ofterrorism is that the Secretary of State is no 
longer involved with deciding if an event was an act of terrorism. Instead, the Secretary of the 
Treasury must now consult with the Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security 
to make this decision. 
Other changes made in the reauthorization were to the structure of how coverage and 
payment would occur. The insurer deductible was set at twenty percent ofthe previous year's 
direct earned premium. The federal government's share of compensation for losses is set at 
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eighty-five percent of losses above the deductible until the start of 2016. After that, the 
government's share will decrease by one percentage point per year until it reaches eighty 
percent. The program trigger has been changed for each year of the program until expiration. 
The trigger was changed so that aggregate industry losses must exceed $100 million in 2015, 
$120 million in 2016, $140 million in 2017, $160 million in 2018, $180 million in 2019, and $200 
million in 2020 in order for the industry to qualify for assistance from the federal government. 
The reauthorization act also adjusted the government recoupment process and the insurance 
marketplace aggregate retention amount. ("Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA)") 
Congress also wrote a few housekeeping items into the Terrorism Risk Insurance 
Program Reauthorization Act of 2015 in order to attempt to provide some clarity on the ability 
of the insurance industry to provide terrorism coverage and the direction in which it is heading. 
The Secretary of the Treasury is required to study and report by October 2015 on the process of 
certifying an event as an act of terrorism. One main topic that is expected to be covered here is 
the "establishment of a reasonable timetable by which the Secretary must make an accurate 
determination on whether to certify an act as an act of terrorism" ("Terrorism Risk Insurance 
Act (TRIA)"). Insurers are also required to submit reports at the end of June every year starting 
in 2016 on various types of information on the coverage of terrorism losses. The Secretary of 
Treasury is to take these reports and then compile information on the challenges for small 
insurers of participating in the terrorism risk insurance marketplace. Finally, the Secretary of 
the Treasury is required to create a committee of people from the insurance industry to provide 
input on developing a risk-sharing program for terrorism coverage that does not involve the 
government. (Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA)") 
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VI. The Existence of Terrorism Insurance Abroad 
Terrorism insurance is not unique to the United States. Even before the terrorist attacks 
of 2001 shook the world, other countries began passing their own legislation regarding 
coverage for the terrorism risk. Some ofthis was due to terrorist attacks that they had 
experienced on their own soil. Regardless of when it was passed, though, insurance for the 
terrorism risk exists all around the world . Major countries that have their own programs for 
insuring terrorism include Australia, Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands, South 
Africa, Spain, and the United Kingdom, but programs can be found in other countries around 
the world as well (Airmic Technical). These programs all have substantial similarities and 
differences when compared to the Terrorism Risk Insurance Program in place in the United 
States. 
One key point of similarity and difference among the world's terrorism insurance 
programs is in the way these programs define an act ofterrorism and trigger the program. 
While the United States requires the government to certify an event as an act of terrorism 
before coverage will apply, no formal declaration is needed in France; an attack must simply 
meet the definition of terrorism spelled out in the legislation for coverage to kick in. Policies are 
similar to this in Russia and Spain, but the United Kingdom requires the issue of a certificate 
proclaiming that an act of terrorism has occurred, similar to the operation of the United 
States's Terrorism Risk Insurance Program. (Airmic Technical) 
Another key point of comparison among terrorism insurance programs is the excluded 
lines of insurance. Two major exclusions seen in nearly every terrorism risk insurance program 
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in the world are life insurance and health insurance. This is because these programs are 
designed specifically for property/casualty lines of insurance. Other common exclusions include 
marine insurance, aviation insurance, automobile insurance of various types, burglary and theft 
insurance, liability insurance of various types, .and financial insurance of various types. Some 
countries, such as France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, have exclusions for perils 
such as war, nuclear attacks, or other chemical/biological warfare. While the United States does 
not have a specific exclusion for nuclear, biological, chemical and radiological terrorism, these 
perils are also not explicitly covered under the terrorism insurance policy. (Airmic Technical) 
While the Terrorism Risk Insurance Program of the United States is a federal backstop 
program to protect the insurance industry, many other countries insure terrorism using a risk 
pool in which insurance companies protect each other rather than having the government do 
so. The government does provide a layer of protection in some of these pools, but most of the 
responsibility falls on the insurance companies. In the Netherlands, a specific terrorism 
reinsurance company was created to provide the protection that insurance companies needed 
to be able to insure terrorism. In the United Kingdom, there is a risk pool formed by insurers, 
but the government "acts as the reinsurer of last resort, guaranteeing payments above the 
industry retention" to provide an overarching security to the industry. ("Terrorism Risk and 
Insurance") 
VII. The Need for TRIA: Should We Keep Renewing It? 
The Terrorism Risk Insurance Program has been in place nearly consistently for almost 
thirteen years, but as the expirations for each act have drawn near, critics have raised questions 
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as to whether the industry still needs this federal backstop for terrorism losses. This was seen 
particularly prevalently as the 2007 extension was nearing expiration in 2014. While the 
program was reinstated very shortly after its expiration, the debate will undoubtedly continue 
and even heat up once the current program extension approaches its expiration in the year 
2020 as many argue that the Terrorism Risk Insurance Program was meant to be only a 
temporary solution to the problem of insuring against terrorism. However, when one examines 
the continuing lack of actuarial data on terrorism, the effect that a catastrophic blow to the 
insurance industry can have on the entire economy, and the infrequency and wildly varying 
severity ofterrorist events, it is apparent that the insurance industry still desperately needs the 
government's risk-sharing program to provide coverage for terrorism losses, and there will 
probably never be a time when the industry can function without this program or something 
similar to it. 
Critics ofthe renewals ofthe program have argued that the insurance industry no longer 
needs the federal backstop for terrorism losses, and the adjustment of the loss-sharing 
mechanisms by Congress indicates a shift toward the insurance agency taking on more of the 
risk for terrorism losses. They say that the insurance industry has "healed and could price in and 
model the danger of terror attacks, but the permanent Washington backstop interferes with 
such commercial evolution" ("Taxpayer Insurance for Business, Yeah"). It is easy to say that we 
no longer need the program since there have been no terrorist attacks for the last fourteen 
years with the exception of the Boston Marathon bombing. However, critics that say these 
things fail to understand that insurers are no more capable of insuring the terrorism risk than 
they were during the insurance crisis immediately following the attacks of 2001 primarily 
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because of this lack of further attacks. Since there have been no other terrorist attacks, 
actuaries have not been able to gather any data about the frequency or severity of terrorist 
attacks and therefore have no more data than they had in 2001 to form an accurate predictive 
model for the possibility of future terrorist attacks. With no useful models for pricing terrorism 
insurance and predicting losses, the insurance industry is in no better shape for insuring 
terrorism on its own now than it was on September 12, 2001. Organizations that specialize in 
risk management can put together models to the best of their abilities, but "because of the lack 
of underlying credible data, only time and unfortunate incidents will provide the real risk 
assessments" (Bacchus, Clark, and Rabs). In other words, the only thing that will improve the 
industry's ability to insure terrorism on its own is the occurrence of more terrorist attacks, 
which everyone hopes to avoid. 
There are additional issues with data availability besides a lack of terrorist attacks, 
however. Even for events that have occurred, insurers do not have access to a lot of the 
information about these attacks that they would need to formulate models. This is because 
"data on terrorist groups' activities and current threats are normally kept secret by federal 
agencies for national security reasons" (Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan 205). With this 
information unavailable, it is difficult for insurers to gain an understanding of the capabilities 
and opportunities of terrorists to carry out their destructive plans. Additionally, terrorists must 
base their actions on the actions of those they wish to attack. If the government is tightening 
security and taking other such actions, this will affect what the terrorists do because they will 
be searching for ways to work around all of the measures that are being put into place to 
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subdue them. Such a complicated system of moves and countermoves makes trying to predict 
terrorist attacks a tough task even if there is data to work with. 
The root purpose and importance of insurance is to provide financial security and 
ensure stability in the face of the threat of catastrophe. This is true of personal insurance for 
individuals and it is true of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Program for the United States 
economy. The insurance industry is vital to the stability of the United States economy; without 
insurance, catastrophic losses would be detrimental to businesses and individuals alike. When 
the Terrorism Risk Insurance Program was put into place, it was because the program was 
needed to "smooth out the effects of the terrorist attacks and the economic downturn" (Manns 
2523). As the Senate discussed the issue of renewing the program before the end of 2014, 
Senator Mike Crapo noted, "Getting terrorism risk insurance right is important both to protect 
taxpayers and to limit the financial and physical impacts of any future terrorist attacks." (qtd. in 
Crittenden) Senator Charles Schumer also added, "Economic development, construction and 
hundreds of thousands of jobs depend on this program." (qtd in Crittenden) The program had 
bipartisan support and passed by a landslide because the men and women of Congress 
understand the necessity of the program to the economy. The losses of the terrorist attacks of 
2001 hit the insurance industry hard. Insurers immediately began to warn the government that 
if no action was taken and another event like these attacks happened, it was likely that the 
insurance industry would collapse. The Terrorism Risk Insurance Program exists to protect the 
insurance industry from catastrophic terrorism losses, and this makes it possible for the 
insurance industry to protect the public from these losses in turn. If the program did not exist, 
either insurance companies would collapse while trying to insure terrorism losses alone, or 
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businesses would go bankrupt by trying to sustain the losses by themselves in an environment 
where insurers are unwilling and unable to offer coverage for the terrorism risk. 
When the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon happened on 
September 11, 2001, the entire world was shocked by the magnitude of the event. These 
attacks were by far the single most costly terrorist event of all time, coming in at nearly $25 
billion (2013 dollars) in insured property losses ("Terrorism Risk and Insurance"). The next most 
costly terrorist event occurred in 1993 and resulted in roughly $1.2 billion (2013 dollars) in 
insured property losses, a substantial drop-off from the losses ofthe 2001 attacks ("Terrorism 
Risk and Insurance"). With such a wide range of loss amounts to consider, insurance companies 
cannot accurately gauge how much they would need to charge for terrorism insurance 
premiums or how much they would need to hold in reserves to be able to cover potentially 
disastrous claims without going bankrupt. The industry simply cannot bank on the idea that any 
future occurrences will be minor; the entire point of insurance, after all, is to provide protection 
against losses that would otherwise be catastrophic. Tom Santos, the vice president of federal 
affairs for the American Insurance Association, said of the issue, "We know that terrorism is a 
peril that doesn't really pass the test of insurance. Insurers or carriers can't model for it. They 
can't underwrite their frequency. They don't know where the event's going to happen." (qtd. in 
Scholtes 1841) This can be easier to see through comparisons. Insuring natural disasters such 
as hurricanes and earthquakes is similar to insuring terrorism in that predicting the losses is 
much more complex and difficult than predicting losses for other lines of insurance such as life 
insurance. However, "unlike natural catastrophes, there are currently so few data points on the 
occurrence ofterrorism that it is extremely difficult to calculate probabilities of a risk's 
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occurrence and its magnitude" (Manns 2517). Insurers can study the movement of the earth's 
plates or weather patterns to help them insure earthquakes or hurricanes, but there is no 
equivalent to this for the terrorism risk. In fact, "terrorists often purposefully avoid attacking in 
patterns in order to minimize the possibility of capture and presumably to maximize terror" 
(Manns 2517). This wild unpredictability goes against one of the fundamental requirements of 
an insurable risk, which is why terrorism is such a difficult risk to insure. 
VIII. Conclusion 
Terrorism is a serious threat to countries all around the world. It can take the lives of 
large groups of innocent citizens and can cause extensive damage to infrastructure. These 
tragedies can have negative effects on the economy as well as unsettling people around the 
world. Fortunately, the United States along with many other countries globally have taken steps 
to protect the economy from the ruin that can follow a terrorist attack. Most other countries 
have formed risk pools to insure terrorism, but in America, terrorism insurance comes in the 
form of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Program in place since 2002 and currently set to run 
through the year 2020. The program requires property/casualty insurers to offer terrorism 
insurance and distributes the risk between these insurers and the federal government. It is 
designed so that in the event of a catastrophic terrorism attack, insurance companies will be 
shielded from collapsing under the weight of astronomical insured property losses. If an attack 
occurs and certain specifications are met, the insurance industry must pay a deductible. Once 
this happens, the federal government takes a percentage of losses up to a certain limit, leaving 
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the remaining percent to insurers. The federal government can then recoup the claims it paid 
out by charging insurers premiums at a later date. 
When one assesses the state ofthe insurance industry and the qualities of terrorism as 
an insurable risk, it is apparent that the United States still needs the Terrorism Risk Insurance 
Program to protect it from future terrorist attacks. With the lack of usable data to model 
terrorism, the need for the insurance industry to be stable for the sake of the economy in the 
event of a terrorist attack, and the total lack of predictability of when terrorism will occur and 
how much the losses will be, the insurance industry needs help if it is to be expected to provide 
coverage for the terrorism risk. If the government were to decide to get rid of the Terrorism 
Risk Insurance Program, it would have to have a viable alternative to put into place immediately 
or risk economic turmoil. Many ideas for solutions have been put forth by various economists 
and insurance experts since the program's first extension in 2005, but little has been done to 
date to assess the feasibility of these ideas. For now, the men and women of Congress seem 
content to allow the Terrorism Risk Insurance Program to remain the insurance industry's 
source of stability in the event of a terrorist attack despite criticisms they receive for this. Some 
even argue that it is the government's duty to provide assistance with terrorism insurance 
because "security policies actively shape the risk of terrorism that insurance companies set out 
to cover" (Aradau and van Munster 193). Whether this is true or not, the reality is that until 
initiative is taken to propose a real, permanent solution to the issue of properly insuring 
terrorism, it is likely that Congress will continue to renew the Terrorism Risk Insurance Program 
each time it expires. One need only look to the policies of other countries to see that terrorism 
insurance is widely regarded as a necessity for any developed country wishing to safeguard 
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against the severe negative economic effects that a major terrorist attack can have. Failing to 
have a program in place for terrorism insurance in the United States will leave 
property/casualty insurers helpless and the United States economy vulnerable in the event of a 
terrorist attack. 
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